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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
A journal published by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Contents: Volume 1, Number 1 (2002)

Natalie Depraz and Shaun Gallagher: Editorial Introduction (pp. 1-6)

Dan Zahavi: First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology (pp. 7-26)

The article examines some of the main theses about self-awareness developed in recent analytic philosophy of mind (especially the work of Bermúdez), and points to a number of striking overlaps between these accounts and the ones to be found in phenomenology. Given the real risk of unintended repetitions, it is argued that it would be counterproductive for philosophy of mind to ignore already existing resources, and that both analytical philosophy and phenomenology would profit from a more open exchange.

Alan Murray: Philosophy And The 'Anteriority Complex' (pp. 27-47)

The project of naturalising phenomenology is examined within the larger context of the philosophy of science. Transcendental phenomenology, as defended by Husserl, in opposition to the naturalistic enterprise, reflects a particular way of thinking about philosophy and its relationship to the empirical sciences that stands as an obstacle to the project of natualisation. This paper develops a critique of a basic assumption made in this conception of philosophy, namely that it is possible to ask and answer questions concerning knowledge in the abstract, prior to and independently of the various investigative contexts which are the immediate concern of practicing scientists. To successfully naturalise phenomenology, we need to abandon this conception of philosophy.

J. Cole, S. Gallagher and D. McNeill: Gesture following deafferentation: A phenomenologically informed experimental study (pp. 49-67)

Empirical studies of gesture in a subject who has lost proprioception and the sense of touch from the neck down show that specific aspects of gesture remain normal despite abnormal motor processes for instrumental movement. The experiments suggest that gesture, as a linguistic phenomenon, is not reducible to instrumental movement. They also support and extend claims made by Merleau-Ponty concerning the relationship between language and cognition. Gesture, as language, contributes to the accomplishment of thought.

Historical Document
Dorion Cairns (1901-1973): Phenomenology and Present-Day Psychology (pp. 69-77)

Written before World War II, this previously unpublished text urges an approach by which phenomenologists can dialog with naturalistic-scientific psychologists that may be more relevant today than when it was originally written. Cairns's chief criticism of behaviorism is that it confines itself to behavior as encountered in sensuous perception and thus excludes direct and indirect reflective experiencing. Although the "introspectionist" psychology of his time recognizes something psychic in the traditional and Jamesian sense, his criticism of this approach is that it focuses on mental contents, i.e., the sensuous appearances of things. Cairns is concerned to foster reflective experiencing of acts of consciousness as well as contents. He seeks to outline how phenomenologists might politely challenge objectivistic psychologists of good will and encourage them to include reflective experiencing among their methods.

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