No Frames: Index _/_/_/_/_/ Frames

Colloquium: Beyond the Hard Problem: Consequences of Neurophenomenology

The Center for Consciousness Studies and
the Association for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences

Boulder, Colorado, USA, May 25-26, 2001

A colloquium sponsored by the Association for Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences will take place in Boulder, Colorado, USA, May 25-26, 2001. The meeting will take the form of a mini-conference devoted to the theme "Beyond the Hard Problem: Consequences of Neurophenomenology" (see description below). Location: Hotel Boulderado (a lovely old historic hotel in downtown Boulder). The meeting is organized by Robert Hanna (University of Colorado, Boulder) and Evan Thompson (York University). This mini-conference is being funded by a research grant held by Robert Hanna and Evan Thompson, from the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of Arizona.

The aim of the conference is to discuss new work on consciousness using the non-reductive methods of neurophenomenology, with special attention to the implications of neurophenomenology for modal argumentation and the problem of mental causation in analytic philosophy of mind.

The format of the conference is designed to maximize intensive critical discussion of philosophical work-in-progress within an informal small-group setting. There will be four three-hour sessions altogether, one for each of four papers. Each paper will have a commentator; but the commentaries will be extemporaneous, and have the sole purpose of constructively leading the general critical discussion. The four confirmed speakers are: (1) Robert Hanna & Evan Thompson; (2) Francisco J. Varela; (3) David Chalmers; and (4) Alva No‘.

"Beyond the Hard Problem: Consequences of Neurophenomenology"

Neurophenomenology, as originally proposed by Francisco J. Varela, is a non-reductive method in cognitive science that stresses the essential complementarity of neuroscientific (including second-order physical or functional) and phenomenological descriptions of the mental. One important consequence of accepting neurophenomenology as a philosophical starting point is the assumption that mental properties are neither identical to nor logically supervenient on physical properties, yet remain nomologically or causally related to physical properties. Another important consequence is that the proper object of cognitive science is neither mind per se nor matter per se but instead living bodies or organisms--animals--that are bearers of irreducible mental properties and physical properties alike. The purpose of this mini-conference is to explore these and other consequences of neurophenomenology, with special emphases on consciousness, modal arguments in the philosophy of mind, and mental causation.

No Frames: Index _/_/_/_/_/ Frames