Colloquium: Intentionality and Experience


Meeting of the Association for Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Hosted by the Danish Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities

Copenhagen, June 25-26, 2001

Intentionality and Experience. Chalmer's distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems implies that phenomenal consciousness, subjectivity, experience is one thing, intentionality something quite different. But is that really true? Is it possible to understand intentionality without taking experience, the first-person perspective, semantics etc. into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of subjectivity and experience if we ignore intentionality, or do we not run the risk of restating a Cartesian subject-world dualism that ignores everything that is captured by the phrase being-in-the-world?

A wide variety of presentations, allowing for a mixture of approaches, including phenomenology, cognitive science, and analytical philosophy of mind.

Conference Schedule

Monday June 25

Holberg Room, Black Diamond, S┐ren Kierkegaards Plads 1, Copenhagen

10.00-10.15 Welcome by Birgitte Possing

10.15-10.45 Dan Zahavi: Opening Issues

10.45-11.15 Discussion

11.15-11.45 Brian Smith (Indiana University): "First-person disquotation: inside and outside of the mind-world relation."

11.45-12.00 Comments by Mark van Atten (Utrecht University)

12.00-12.45 Discussion

12.45-13.45 Lunch

13.45-14.15 Eduard Marbach (University of Bern): "Re-presentation and experience"

14.15-14.30 Comments by Natalie Depraz (Sorbonne)

14.30-15.15 Discussion

15.15-15.45 Break

15.45-16.15 Piet Hut (Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton): "Six ways to view the world"

16.15-16.30 Comments by Josef Parnas (University of Copenhagen) 16.30-17.15 Discussion

17.15-17.45 Shaun Gallagher (Canisius College): "First-person access to second-person intentionality."

17.45-18.15 Discussion

Tuesday June 26 Holberg Room, Black Diamond, S┐ren Kierkegaards Plads 1, Copenhagen

10.00-10.30 Jean Petitot (CREA): "Perception, non-conceptual contents and ante-predicative experience."

10.30-10.45 Comments by Louis Sass (Rutgers)

10.45-11.30 Discussion

11.30-12.00 Yoko Arisaka (University of San Francisco): "Some ontological confusions in recent theories of intentionality."

12.00-12.30 Discussion

12.30-13.30 Lunch

13.30-14.00 Jonathan Cole (University of Southampton): "On the perception and timing of action without feedback."

14.00-14.30 Discussion

14.30-15.00 Jennifer Whiting (Cornell University): "First-person beliefs and imaginary fission cases."

15.00-15.15 Comments by Shaun Gallagher (Canisius College)

15.15-16.00 Discussion

16.00-16.30 Break

16.30-17.00 Denis Fisette (UQAM): "How can phenomenology contribute to solve the problem of consciousness? Reflections on the╩natural method."

17.00-17.30 Discussion

17.30-18.00 Future Plans

Conference Location:

The conference will take place at the 'Black Diamond', the new building of the Royal Library. More information to follow.

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